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1. AnTeCedenTS And GeneSIS oF JudICIAl ReVIew1 
To legal positivists and proponents of the analytical school of jurisprudence 
control of constitutionality of laws emerges from the acting constitution 
and all other speculation should be ignored.
  Others attribute the birth of judicial review of constitutionality to the 
invention of judges and law professors and one could hardly challenge 
the facts that it was the contribution of John Marshall in the US and Hans 
Kelsen in Austria that gave brought to life judicial review of constitutionality 
and the constitutional courts.  
No one has challenged the birth date of judicial review so far. It was 
1803 famous decision of the Supreme Court decision  Marbury v. Madison 
and the solid argument of Chief Justice J. Marshall. This decision might 
be considered as a historical act having tantamount significance only 
to the drafting of the 1787 US constitution. For if the Founding Fathers 
secured American independence and a successful development of the 
Union, the judicial review fostered constitutional supremacy and long 
levity of the Federal constitution.
And yet we might look for antecedents of judicial review in the previous 
stages of development for as history proves there are almost no ideas 
and phenomena emerging at once and out of nothing. 
There is no doubt that the essential prerequisite to the birth of judicial 
review is the status of the constitution as the «law of the land» or as 
the «highest law». 
If we extend the concept of higher law to other sources of law, before 
the appearance of written constitution we will find embryos of judicial 
review even in the antiquity.2  Another source of shaping judicial review 
were the political ideas of thinkers devised to check arbitrary power 
since antiquity, middle ages and especially during the enlightment.
  Aristotle, Polibius and Cicero, developed the first concepts of the 
mixed government and separation of powers. One, certainly, will never 
find a scheme that they might have contrived even of an analogous 
device to judicial review even if their lost writings will be found.
  The seeds of the idea of checking an arbitrary power grew in 
various currents of jurisprudence, political thought and practice even 
before the rebellious barons imposed Magna Carta Libertatum on 
king John. 
Since St. Thoma Aquinas vindicated that an unjust law is not a law 
at all and should not be obeyed, various mechanisms of limitation 
of power were proposed. The range of enquiry was extensive and 
the means include:
Civil disobedience to a despotic rule even in the form of enacted • 
law (No doubt the roots of the idea of civil disobedience have 
been traced so far to Sophocles),
the separation of powers, developed further by Marsilio of Padua • 
in the church and state conflict, and especially in the enlightment 
by J. Locke, Montesque, abbey Mably and others, 
resistance, dethroning and even murdering of a despot, if the • 
king's commands are contrary to the law of God or violates the 
Gods rules or devastates the church,3
Withdrawal of people's support to the power of a tyrant,• 4
The present article demonstrates the role and functions of the 
constitutional control in different countries, including Bulgaria. Control 
of constitutionality of laws exists in various forms in contemporary 
world. Constitutional courts act as harmonizers of national constitutional 
and supranational values, principles and norms and resolving conflicts 
between national and supranational legal orders and  institutions. 
Moreover, constitutional courts act as ultimate judicial safeguard of 
fundamental human rights and as border guards containing the state 
institutions within the constitutional limits of their powers.
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2The classic example to look for is ancient Greece. In the Athenian Polity a nomoi 
were regarded as a higher law and a complex and time wasting procedure to their 
revision was devised. Heavy responsibility was placed on person having proposed 
an amendment that subsequently was not ratified or proved to be inadvisable.. 
In one of the periods of the Greek history in 5 c. b. c. the capital punishment was 
even introduced. A special committee named helea was formed to the popular 
assembly to filter the new laws and amendments proposed in order to safeguard 
the supremacy of the acting laws and to eliminate inadequate drafts. Although 
this was certainly not a judicial activity neither it was carried by the courts, still it 
can be regarded as the  first example or an antecedent to the judicial review., B. 
Leoni, Freedom and the Law, 1962, 77-78;  M.Cappelletti, W. Cohen, Comparative 
Constitutional Law , Charlottesville, 1977, 5-6.
3During the Restoration after the massacre on St.Bartolomew Day of  the french 
hugennots See S.J. Brutus, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, 1579.
4E.La Buassie,Chains of the Voluntary Servitude, in 17 century France.
5See G.Buchanan, De Jure Regni Apud Scotos (The Powers of the Crown in Scotland), 
Austin, 1949, 89; In the U.S. it was T. Jefferson that intended to integrate the right 
to a revolution into the system of government. A small insurrection each 20 years 
should control the oppressive ambitions of the rulers.
6B. Coxe, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstituional Legislation, Philadelphia,1893, 
24. 
7Since the time when the Instrument of government, created by O. Cromwell was 
suspended, Great Britain did not even attempt to entrench governmental relationships 
and fundamental liberties in a written constitution.
8Some of these reasons explain why in France a very limited specific model of control 
of constitutionality was created only by 1958, why the President and Prime minister 
were the only initial parties that have been granted standing, knowing the fact that 
almost a decade before the Marbury v. Madison decision Abbey Sieyes proposed 
to create a system of J.R. To some extent this is an answer to the B.Constant's 
proposition that the Head of State should be the fourth branch of power, that was 
contrived to be povoir neutre i.e.  neutral power. 
9G.Haratyunyan, A.Mavcic, The Constitutional Review and Its Development in the 
Modern World,Yerevan-Lyblyana,1999, 12-35.
1The present article was published at: http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Papers/ 
BUL_Tanchev_ E.pdf.
Resistance to oppression in the form of insurrection and deposing • 
arbitrary government.5 
 Various currents of political thought had different justifications to 
these checks upon despotic laws and governments:
It was considered to be infringement of the law of nature by the • 
exponents of the Natural law, 
It was considered contrary to the Divine law,• 
It was declared to be an infringement of the social  compact, by the • 
representatives of social contract doctrine
It was declared to be usurpation of popular sovereignty by the radical • 
democratic theoreticians. 
All of these checks were meant to be spontaneous, sporadic and ultimate 
remedies against injustice and oppression. They were not built as an 
institutionalized restraint of a governmental excessive power, a restraint 
accessible at relatively small social costs, which was available to each one 
and to all the citizens that could afford the expenses of litigation.
  Judicial review is one of these regularized restraints that are indispensable 
to the liberal constitutionalism. It polices government, preventing 
authoritarianism and arbitrary rule, serves as an ultimate remedy when 
constitutional human rights have been violated. Another very important 
implication in the context of the political system is to act as a safety 
valve to reduce social conflicts, to prevent drastic change and to protect 
minorities against oppressive majorities. By resolving deep social and 
political conflicts as legal or constitutional cases judicial review reduces 
social tension and prevents it from exacerbating into civil disturbances, 
wars or insurrections. Political controversies are elevated and resolved 
as legal questions.
The first universally recognized precedents by the constitutional scholars 
and cited as genesis of the modern judicial review belongs to the British 
constitutional practice.
It was sir E. Coke stated and implemented judicial review, recognizing 
the supremacy of the common law in the beginning of the 17 century 
in Great Britain. In the famous Bonham's case of 1610 Coke stated «that 
in many cases, the common law will controul acts of parliament, and 
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament 
is again common right and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it and ajudge such act to 
be void».6  
However this precedent does not lead to the development of a full 
fledged judicial review in Britain possibly because of two factors. In the 
years that followed kings power achieved its ascendancy and during the 
revolutionary turmoil nobody ascribed to affirm the judicial review.7
Why constitutional review came so late in the European constitutionalism? 
It was more than a century after Marbury v. Madison, it was after the 
W.W.I that first models were drafted in Europe and in most countries 
even after 1950ies.
Looking at the causes that make control of constitutionality of laws 
an indispensable attribute to the modern constitutional system one 
should mention:
a. A written constitution
b. a willingness of the governing elites, parties, leaders and general 
public to observe the supremacy of the C. and the rule of law;(in other 
words a democratic political and legal culture);
c. balanced government, founded on separation of powers  between 
the three branches, between the constituent and constituted power, 
and between the union and its members if the federalism prevails
d. lack of arbitrary government either by the Executive as one man rule 
or by the supremacy of the legislature or the legislative despotism 
e. denial of uncontrolled popular sovereignty, exercised directly or by 
omnipotent legislature as a tyranny of the majority
f. respect of the individual liberties and minority rights.
Having in mind these reasons one can answer the questions about the late 
origin of the judicial review in Europe, impossibility of the establishment 
of judicial review in the antiquity in the middle ages, in the communist 
and fascist systems or in some of the third world countries.8 
 2. ModelS And STRuCTuReS oF ConTRol  
oF ConSTITuTIonAlITy
Control of constitutionality of laws exists in various forms in contemporary 
world. The general rule is that control of constitutionality should be 
located outside the Legislative and the Executive branch.9 There has not 
been made any serious attempts to entrust control of constitutionality 
to the Executive, although even at Philadelphia some of the framers 
The Abbe Sieyes
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considered a Council of Revision to the Chief Executive and in Bulgaria 
during 1980ies there was a proposal to create analogous organ to the 
President.10 
Efforts to include control of constitutionality among the powers of the 
Legislature were equally meaningless for the only result would have 
been an omnipotent despotic parliament or a convention like that of 
1793 during the Jacobine regime in France. Instead of controlling the 
Legislature control of constitutionality would have been transformed 
into a formidable weapon of legislative control. Constitutional supremacy 
would have lost any meaning for it would have been dissolved in the 
Legislative supremacy.
The only possible solution then common to all the models of control of 
constituionalty of laws is vesting this function in the courts, or creating 
a special institution outside the traditional judicial power, but never 
attributing the function to the Legislative or the Executive branches. One 
can remember the justification by Al. Hamilton in the Federalist Papers 
and Alexander Bickel's book «The Least Dangerous Branch». 
Since J.J. Rousseau and J. Bentham’s proponents of the popular sovereignty 
and legislative supremacy doctrines still argue on the admissibility and 
rationality of entrusting CC to the courts. In the words of J.Bentham 
«Give to the Judges a power of annulling the acts(laws);and you transfer 
a portion of the supreme power from assembly, which the people have 
had some share, at least, in choosing, to a set of men in the choice of 
whom, they have not the least imaginable share.»11  
  To this argument has been added a very small portion by the followers 
which especially enjoy to label and accuse judges of legislative and even 
constituent power encroachment or usurpation when they declare a law, 
repugnant to the constitution to be void. By interpreting the constitution 
the courts develop the meaning of the constitutional provisions and in 
fact adapt the constitution to the new realities.
Sometimes the Courts are qualified as an independent policy makers, 
leaders of a public opinion, arbiter in the conflicts between the powers, 
catalyst of social change and the basic institutions which lead America 
to a «government by judiciary“.12  
  The critics of judicial review of constitutionality of laws label the 
Supreme court as a supreme legislator,13 super legislature,14 last resort 
that discovers the framers intent15 and a third chamber or permanent 
constitutional convention.16
According to the structures for its implementation control of 
constitutionality might be diffused (deconcentrated) or concentrated 
one. In a diffused system judicial review is carried by plural institutions, 
usually the courts and in the concentrated system constitutional control 
is vested in a single institution being a court or a special council for 
constitutional supervision. 
Prior Control of Constitutionality is the only available form in the Vth 
French Repubic, while in other countries like Austria, Hungary and others 
it is combined with posterior control of constitutionality.
Prior control of constitutionality can be only an abstract one while 
posterior control of constitutionality  can be either abstract or a concrete 
one.
Various systems of control of constitutionality are exercised by four 
models in the cotemporary world.
a. The American model of JR has been implemented in Japan, 
Norway, Denmark, Brazil, Argentine, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala  and 
other countries in Latin America during the periods when they have 
democratic constitutions. Judicial review is carried by all the courts in 
the Judicial system.
b. Judicial review might be vested in the Supreme Court. This model 
of is developed in the constitutional system of India, Australia, Swiss 
Confederation, Ireland, Canada, South Africa and others. No other courts 
can decide on constitutionality except the supreme court of the country. 
The common argument is that the control of constitutionality of laws 
is  sophisticated activity and it should be available only to the justices 
that are trained  best and have a long experience.
  c. Control of constitutionality is concentrated in a special court – 
Constitutional Court This system prevails in Europe and the best examples 
are Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, most of the constitutional 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, independent republics of 
the former Soviet Union and others. There is an interesting peculiarity, 
however in Germany. The concentrated control of constitutionality, 
performed by the Federal Constitutional court has not been devised 
to eliminate totally the diffused system of judicial review. While the 
Constitutional court has the exclusive jurisdiction to revise the Federal 
statutes, all the German courts can exercise judicial review revising other 
acts which might be contradictory to the constitution.
All of the constitutions of the emerging democracies have already 
introduced Constitutional courts. And even the constitutions in the 
breakaway  former Soviet union republics have implemented this model to 
replace the committees for constitutional revision established  during the 
Gorby's perestroika but proven to be an unsuccessful experiment.
The Constitutional court pattern was established first in the Austrian 
1920 constitution. This was the original idea of a concentrated and 
firmly institutionalized judicial review initiated by the  famous European 
scholar H. Kelsen. Almost simultaneously the idea  was developed in 
the 1920 Constitution of Czechoslovakia. However, before the end 
of the World War II the control of constitutionality did not meet the 
expectations of the constitution makers. The Constitutional courts were 
most active in settling disputes between the federal and the member 
states governments. Since authoritarianism and totalitarianism were 
opposed to the rule of law Constitutional courts flourished in the post 
World War II constitutions in Europe.
The Constitutional court model of judicial review has certain of 
peculiarities that distinguish this system from the other patterns of 
control of constitutionality of laws.
The Constitutional court is located out of the system of the Courts, 
although it is a special jurisdiction within the judicial branch. In Europe 
the Constitutional courts have been regarded as special kind of political 
courts preordained to safeguard the supremacy of the constitution, the 
integrity of the Constitutional government and to act as the highest and 
ultimate guardian of the human rights.The Constitutional courts review 
all the acts of the Parliament, President and sometimes the normative 
acts of the Cabinet. Unconstitutionality and non compliance to the 
parliamentary legislation of the other acts of governmental administration 
and the infringements of the statutes by the other acts is controlled by 
specialized administrative courts within the judicial branch. 
The Constitutional courts are granted the jurisdiction to resolve the 
conflicts between the branches of government arising from the horizontal 
and the vertical separation of powers.
In contrast to the U S Supreme court the constitutional courts 
have to resolve controversies arising in political life for example 
concerning the results of the general elections, checking the validity 
of parliamentary mandates, deciding on the constitutionality of a 
political party, the refusal of some elected representatives to take 
an oath to the Constitution on the grounds that they oppose some 
provisions of the constitutio.
  In contrast to the American judicial review the Constitutional courts 
annul the law or a part of it that is considered to be unconstitutional 
and their decision has an erga omnes effect.
  Some of the constitutional courts have the power to provide interpretation 
of the provisions of the constitution.
  Some of the constitutional courts are devised to compensate the lack of 
a second chamber of the parliament during a Presidential impeachment, 
since some of the European countries provide for unicameral representative 
assemblies.
Some of the constitutional courts combine prior control of constitutionality 
with posterior judicial review which is performed after the act has been 
enforced (Hungary) 
  d. Control of constitutionality is vested in a specially created political 
institution which is not a court. This institution is situated out of the traditional 
branches of power. This unique system of control of constitutionality 
was devised in the constitution of the Vth French republic and with 
some amendments is  successfully functioning in France since 1958. 
However, analogous model has been a complete failure in the former 
Soviet Union.
Conseil Constitutionnel was the first and reluctant  institutionalization of 
the control of constitutionality in France although the idea was launched 
during the French revolution by abbey Sieyes. Dictatorial regimes, 
notions of parliamentary supremacy and popular sovereignty leading 
to plebiscitary democracy were opposed to control of constitutionality 
for century and a half after the revolution.
  Initially Conceil Constitutionnel was conceived as an autocratic instrument 
of the Executive power, for the president or the Prime minister alone had 
the standing to ask for revision of the parliamentary draft bills. 
  During 1970ies a very important constitutional amendment granted 
standing to a certain number of the members of each one of the both 
houses of Parliament.
  Another important step was made by Conceil Constitutionnel itself. 
In one of its decisions Conseil broadened  the scope of constitutional 
content, invoking the Preamble of the constitution, in which the two great 
declarations of rights are included.  Since then Conseil Constitutionnel 
has assumed the status of a guardian of the fundamental rights and 
liberties.
e. Council of the Guardians of the C.(Iran,1979)
This institution has been established for the purpose of safeguarding 
the principles of Islam and the constitution and to avoid any conflict 
between these principles and the laws of parliament. (art.91).The Council 
One of the works of Hans Kelsen edition in Russian
The Chief Justice of the United States John Marshall
10Luckily these efforts did not prevail for attributing the control of constitutionality 
function to the head of state would no doubt lead to a one man rule. For it is a 
well known fact that this power was inherent prerogative of absolutist kings or 
dictators although resting on a very specific prerequisite. The king alone could 
control constitutionality for he was the only person to know what the constitutions 
is for it was time when raison d ’ etat , monarchical sovereignty and the rule of 
man and not of laws were principles of state.
11J. Bentham, A Comment on the Fragment of Government, London, 1974, 488.
12The New American Political System,1980,17,A.Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 
229; H.J. Abraham, Freedom and the Court,N.Y.,1978,6,  R. Neely How Courts Govern 
America, New York,1981,12-19. 
13A. Berle, The Three Faces of Power, 1967, 49.
14A. S. Miller,  Judicial Activism and American Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism, 
ed. J. R. Pennock, N.Y., 1979, 357.
15E. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today, Washington, 1957, 252. 
16L. Hand, The Bill of Rights, Harvard, 1957, 73. 
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of guardians consists of six members of the clergy «who are just, are 
knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence, and are aware of the needs of the 
times». They are selected by the Leader of the Country.(It is worth noting 
that the leader, according to the article 110 is to appoint the highest 
judicial authorities of the country) Another six lawyers from various 
branches of law, «from among the Moslem lawyers» are nominated by 
the Supreme council of the Judiciary and confirmed by the Assembly.
  3. TypeS oF ConSTITuTIonAl ReVIew And ConSTITuTIonAl 
ReVIew FunCTIonS
Constitutional provisions and legislative norms attribute constitutional 
courts long lists of powers that are most often identified or regarded as 
functions. When constitutional court functions are identified with powers 
although, they vary considerably from country to country in addition to the 
constitutional review of laws, their jurisdiction might include controlling 
electoral processes and cancellation of the elections, guaranteeing the 
autonomy of municipalities, policing the constitutionality of political 
parties or resolving criminal proceedings against high government 
officials. 
  Deciding on conformity of the international treaties before ratification by 
the parliament to the nation state constitution or judging the compliance 
of  laws to the international treaties already signed ratified and enforced 
and the international customary law principles consists another particular 
set of issues in the list of constitutional courts powers.
  It should be emphasized that while the list of powers entrusted to 
the constitutional courts are mistakenly treated for functions they are 
only means or weapons instrumental to carry the functions of judicial 
review of constitutionality of laws.
  Although the genesis and evolution of constitutional review followed 
different pattern depending on the constitutional design and the legal 
family to which the particular institution that was assigned to review 
the parliamentary legislations compliance to the constitution belonged 
they have shared the same set of liberal democratic principles and 
values. Protection of the rule of law starting with the constitutional 
supremacy and fundamental human rights has been the common 
denominator while he difference concerned paths of development, 
growth, logistics of enforcement and quantity of the courts enforcing 
constitutional review. 
  Often the genesis and development of the institutionalized patterns 
of constitutional review has been interpreted to be a pure intellectual 
exercise of judges and professors rather than as being an outcome of 
the essential features of Anglo American ( Anglo Saxon) and civil law 
systems. With no intention to diminish Chief justice John Marshall or 
Hans Kelsens’ contributions in the area of founding constitutional review 
it seems that the legal family context is somewhat more influential and is 
crucial to the content and form of principles and agents of constitutional 
review introduced. Both legal families attributed different roles to the 
judges and legislators. Within the common law tradition the law was 
developed mostly by the judges finding the legal rule to reach judicial 
decision complying to justice in every concrete case. By the system 
of precedent the validity of the rule acquired normative meaning by 
applying it to the identical cases and situations.
While in the US since colonial times judges were trusted and held in 
high esteem, in Europe courts were looked with a great suspicion by 
the parlamentarians and officials in the Executive bodies. 
Two premises were indispensable for the emerging of diffuse decentralized 
incidental judicial review of constitutionality of legislation – the system 
of precedent and courts of general jurisdiction. Lack of these premises 
doomed to failure all efforts to transplant the American system on the 
European soil17 Within the civil law family especially after the French 
revolution the system of positive legislation and general validity rule 
making was affirmed on one side and different limitations on judge 
made law were devised and imposed, on the other.18 The ultimate forms 
of these were the prohibition for the judges to enforce the laws but not 
to interpret them, known as “gramophone justice” meaning that the 
judge is under the obligation to play the record that has been produced 
by the legislator in concrete cases and “telephone justice” when the 
executive put a pressure on the court to achieve a beneficial decision 
by the court.19 To contain the positive legislator within the limits of the 
constitution a negative one was needed and ordinary courts could not 
be entrusted with this function since the judges of general jurisdiction 
were themselves constrained by the parliamentary statues. Decentralized, 
diffuse review in the civil law system would be inoperative for the lack of 
doctrine and practice of stare decisis unifying the system by the rule of 
the precedent. Thus a specialized constitutional court had to be created 
and assigned abstract posterior review of parliamentary statute to ensure 
their compliance to the constitution as the supreme law of the land.20 
Today the constitutional courts or other forms of constitutional review is 
universally accepted as a part of the European constitutional heritage.21 
Scholars still argue whether it was due to the popular sovereignty and 
democratic cravings rising from the grassroots or either it is introduced 
by the political elites.22 The latter has been titled insurance model.By 
introducing judicial review it is a kind of a security investment protecting 
a former governing party when becoming an opposition one.23 
Several types of functions might be distinguished among the institutions 
for judicial or constitutional review. Functions might be divided into 
universal exemplified by all bodies entrusted or recognized by the 
constituent power to control compliance to the constitution or specific – 
consisting of those particular institutions that have been assigned in 
some nation states to be the guardians of the law of the land. According 
to their nature constitutional courts functions might be constitutional 
(legal) or socio political. They might be strictly national when entrusted 
by nation state constitution to the national courts or supranational if 
performed by supranational courts. Finally they might be treated as 
manifest (indispensable), implicit or surrogate when the bodies of 
constitutional review act to compensate an institution that has not 
been created by the national constituent authority but exists in other 
nation state constitutions.
 An attempt to review most important functions of the constitutional 
courts would include the enumeration without any claim produce 
an exhaustive list of them. It would be also contra productive to 
declare a priori which of them are more important than the others 
or to propose a hierarchical structure of various functions of the 
constitutional courts. However between the functions two groups 
could be distinguished. The first one would include functions common 
to all of the constitutional courts and bodies entrusted with the 
review of constitutionality of laws.
1.Constitutional Courts have been recognized by the constitution 
drafters to be the Guardians of  Constitutional Supremacy. Constitutional 
courts perform the function of supreme policeman of the Constitution. 
It seems that all of the Constitutional court powers are oriented in this 
direction. However, this is obviously the case with the most typical of 
the powers – abstract control of the constitutionality of laws having 
erga omnes effect. Where the Constitutional courts were established 
abstract posterior control has been monopoly of the Constitutional 
court though constitutionality and constitutional conformity might 
be recognized and more than this accepted by all other legal subjects 
until its unconstitutionality would not be declared by the court.
2.Constitutional review has been the voice and Guardian of the 
constitution’s content as established by the constituent power. According 
to the classical democratic theory the nation state constituent power 
being an expression of popular sovereignty creates the constitution 
and has no place in legislation, practical executive government and 
adjudication of justice and deciding cases by the courts. The constituent 
power does not disappear but assumes a latent status or it “ falls into sleep”. 
It springs to life and becomes active when the terms of the constitutional 
contract need an amendment or the nation and its political elites have 
arrived to political decision to adopt new constitution.24 While being 
in a latent position it is the constitutional court that voices the exact 
meaning of constitutional provisions, might interpret them but staying 
within the limits of the founding fathers will. Even the boldest judicial 
activist should accept that the constitutional court interpretation might 
update the constitutional provisions but it cannot amend or develop the 
constitutional content beyond the will of the founders. The process of 
growth of the constitution is not tantamount to constitutional amendment 
which is a legitimate monopoly of constituent power as emanation of 
popular sovereignty.
Within this function the constitutional courts primary role would be 
in voicing and keeping the content of the constitution as established 
through popular sovereignty by constituent power. Though it is generally 
accepted that division between constituent and constituted powers is a 
monopoly belonging to the civil law family firmly established since E.Sieyes 
it should be emphasized that in the American system it was stipulated 
as a premise to the birth and enforcement of judicial constitutional 
review by the court itself.25 
3.Constitutional Courts act as ultimate judicial safeguard of fundamental 
human rights. No doubt this position of the courts is cornerstone in the 
Karl Schmidt Evgeny Tanchev during his work in the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria
17See Louis Favoreu, Le Cours constitutionnelles 1996 ( Луи Фаворьо, Конституци-
онните съдилища, София 2002, 10-15 ).
18Some attribute genesis of centralized  of centralized concentrated constitutional 
review having jurisdictional monopoly over constitutional issues to legal education 
in Europe, the role of career judges in deciding policy issues, the merger  of the 
executive and legislative power in the prime minister through his position as leader 
of  the   party that has won the general elections, recognition and protection 
of fundamental human rights, G.F.de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Judicial Review, Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 3, 977.
19F. Neumann coined the term  phonograph or gramophone justice , see F. Neumann 
the Democratic and  Authoritarian state, The Free Press, New York, 1957, 38.
20For extensive treatment see V.F.Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic 
Values, Yale Univ. Press, London, 2006, 3-29.
21More than 80%  of  the written constitutions around the world have special provisions 
on constitutional review see T.Ginzburg, the Global Spread of the Constitutional 
Review, in the Oxford Handbook on Law and Politics,eds.K.Whittington et.al., Oxford 
University Press, 2008, 81.
22M.Schor,Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, Washington University Global 
Studies Review, vol 7., 2007, 257 -287 www. law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/
Volume7_2/Schor.pdf.
23T.Ginzburg, Judicial Review in the New Democracies, Constitutional Courts in Asian 
cases, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 24-25.
24On drafting a constitution as an act of supreme political decision over the type 
and form  of political unity  see  Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory,  Duke Univ.
Press, 2008, 75-94.
25UK legal system with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty respected should 
be considered to be an exception, for the idea that there should be power above 
the parliament and beyond the reach of parliamentary amendment  undermines 
the parliamentary sovereignty principle. In the famous Marbury v. Madison decision 
judicial review has been affirmed as a safeguard ruling out the option that  “  the 
legislature  may alter the constitution by an ordinary act ” Marbury v.Madison , 
5.U.S.( 1 Cranch) at 177.
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legitimation of judicial review of constitutionality of laws. It was the 
status of the courts as guardians of fundamental constitutional rights 
and liberties that defeated the radical democratic opposition to review 
of constitutionality of laws by judiciary. Parliaments are product of direct 
ascending procedural democratic legitimation through election and 
are entrusted with the democratic will of the nation or majority of the 
electorate. To this source of  legitimation courts consisting of judges 
that are never directly elected by the people bring their constitutional 
legitimacy defending fundamental human right as a last and supreme 
national institution to protect human rights and ultimate resort to defend 
constitutional freedom against an encroachment on human rights by 
parliamentary legislation.
4.Constitutional courts act as border guards containing the state 
institutions within the constitutional limits of their powers. This function 
of Constitutional courts has been performed though in different ways 
and forms with all of their constitutional powers.
5.Constitutional courts act as legal arbiters or agents of constitutional 
and legal arbitrage resolving the conflicts. In this respect status of the 
constitutional courts might be compared to the neutral power or povoir 
neutre described by B.Constant26 and attributed to the head of state 
conceived to be performing neutral arbitrage to resolve, diminish, accelerate, 
prevent, mediate institutional conflict or compromise an outcome beneficial 
to the particpants and tha whole nation. In contrast to this position 
of the head of state performing political arbitrage , the constitutional 
courts exercise constitutional arbitrage – i. e .the conflicts between the 
powers are resolved on the basis and within the constitution. 
6.Constitutional courts act as counter majoritarian check preventing 
despotic aspirations of majorities in government. In the context of 
liberal democracy courts perform function of preventing the majority 
to quash the opposition by protecting minority rights. Probably the 
most symptomatic of this function has been the action of filing petitions 
demanding unconstitutionality decision by the parliamentary minorities – 
parties or MP groups.
With the introduction of the individual constitutional complaint individuals 
when their fundamental rights are abrogated by parliamentary legislation 
adopted by majority have an important source to veto tyranny of the 
majority that has overstepped the constitution.
7.Constitutional Courts acting as a safety valve to decrease the level of 
the social pressure, unrest and prevent the constitution and governmental 
system from self destruction or destruction by the violent extraconstitutional, 
extraparliamentary or illegal action. One of the first explanations of 
the function of procedures, devices and institutions acting as a safety 
valve belongs to N. Machiavelli long before constitutional review of 
legislation emerged.27 Another approach by converting a political or 
extraparliamentary violence into legal conflict one has been emphasized 
by A. De Tocqueville.28 Instead of being resolved by violence on the 
streets the conflicting issue is given in the hands of the court to decide 
within the constitution and with legal means. By this procedure the 
degree of social discontent is reduced from the melting pot of boiling 
emotions and hostilities to impartial and universally accepted procedures 
by people and institutions where the decision is worked out based on 
reason with rational arguments. 
  Without any claim of all inclusive enumeration a list of specific 
constitutional courts functions would include: 
1.Constitutional courts act as harmonizers of national constitutional 
and supranational values, principles and norms and resolving conflicts 
between national and supranational legal orders and institutions. In the 
context of multilevel constitutionalism constitutional courts harmonize 
relationship between national and supranational values and resolve 
conflicts between different constitutional orders. 
2.Constitutional judicial review on parliamentary legislation has been 
considered as a structural check on governmental power proceeding 
out or contrary to the constitutional limitations enumerated powers 
of the institutions. Though situated outside any of the classic branches 
of constituted powers of legislative, executive and judiciary powers 
Constitutional courts can be tackled as an important checks on arbitrary 
powers and on despotic government as a whole.
3 Constitutional review on parliamentary legislation performs the 
function of appeal and resort to the constitutional review to protect 
the constitutional rights and has been entrenched in some constitutions 
itself is a fundamental human right especially where individual complaint 
has been provided or through the indirect access to the constitutional 
courts.29 
4.Constitutional courts exercise transforming function when updating 
the constitution and providing the growth of the constitution or in 
T. Jefferson’s words the constitution should belong to the living and 
not to the dead.30 Providing new interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions in the context of new generations and might be instrumental 
to avoiding the textual constitutional amendment by the constituent 
power. This function of constitutional review might be indispensable to 
the avoiding of gridlocks especially in countries with rigid constitutions. 
It might be instrumental to reduce the cost of the formal constitutional 
amendment trough the cumbersome procedure of election and activity 
of constituent assembly. 
5.Constitutional courts might play as a substitute ( surrogate) or 
compensating role for the lack of a second chamber of parliament 
especially in impeachment trials particularly in those countries where 
the constitution provides impeachment trial while establishing unicameral 
assembly.
6.Constitutional courts are ultimate arbiter on legality of the elections 
and constitutionality of political parties when they are assigned by the 
constitution and entrusted with powers in that areas.
7.Constitutional courts perform function of a criminal jurisdiction 
concerning crimes of high government officials with effective sentencing 
power in the case of finding them guilty if the respective nation state 
constitution has explicitly provided for this. 
  4.FoRMS And ConSequenCeS oF JudICIAl ReVIew By THe 
ConSTITuTIonAl CouRTS 
  According to the time for its implementation it might be prior (preliminary) – 
before the statute has been adopted and enacted or posterior – when the 
bill has been enacted and has become an acting law. (Prior supervision 
exists in Austria, France, Portugal, Hungary and Romania) 
Posterior Constitutional control is of several different kinds:
The first of hem is the incidental supervision during the course of 
litigation pending before courts of general jurisdiction which takes place 
in USA, Switzerland, Greece and Portugal.
Concrete norm supervision compatibility to the constitution occurs 
when in the course of litigation pending before a court with General 
Jurisdiction upon application of that court, which must be either convinced 
in the unconstitutionality of the norm (German Constitution art 100) 
or at least have doubts, which are not evidently unfounded, as to its 
constitutionality (Italy). Concrete norm supervision is to be performed 
in Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Bulgaria and others.
Abstract norm supervision is to be initiated independently of a legal 
dispute by specially qualified petitioners – high state officials, political 
institutions etc.(Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and others.) According to the 
these countries constitutions the President, the Prime minister, a certain 
number of Parliamentary Deputies, the Supreme Courts and General 
The photograph of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria 2009-2012 From left to right judges: Stefka Stoeva,Vanya Angusheva , Georgi Petkanov,  Plamen Kirov,  
Dimitar Tokushev, Emiliya Drumeva, Evgeni Tanchev, Vladislav Slavov, Blagovest Punev, Krassen Stoichev, Tzanka  Tzankova, Roumen Nenkov
D. Buquicchio - President of the European Commission for Democracy through Law 
of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission)
26B.Constant, Principle of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments, in 
Political Writings, Cambridge Univ.Press, 1989, 183-194.
28“The influence of legal habits extends beyond the precise limits I have pointed out. 
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner 
or later, into a judicial question”,  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
Vintage books, New York, 1945, Volume I, Chapter XVI CAUSES WHICH MITIGATE 
THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 290.
29See the Venice Commission special report on the individual complaint CDL-
AD(2010)039rev Study on individual access to constitutional justice - Adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 85th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010) on the 
basis of comments by Gagik HARUTYUNYAN (Member, Armenia),Angelika NUSSBERGER 
(Substitute Member, Germany) Peter PACZOLAY (Member, Hungary).
30The basic meaning of famous quotation has been  stated in its absolutist form 
the  earth belongs to the living not to the dead T.Jefferson’s letter to J.Madison 
of  September 6, 1789, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed.. M.Peterson, Viking 
press, New York, 1975, 444-451, 450.
28“ To those set forward  in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom, no 
more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to accuse, either 
before the people, or before some council or tribunal, those citizens who in any 
way have offended against the liberty of their country. A law of t his kind has two 
effects most beneficial to a State: first, that the citizens from fear of being accused, 
do not engage in attempts hurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once 
and without respect of persons: and next, that a vent is given for the escape of all 
those evil humors which, from whatever cause, gather in cities against particular 
citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for these by the laws, they flow into 
irregular channels and overwhelm the State. There is nothing, therefore, which 
contributes so much to the stability and permanence of a State, as to take care that 
the fermentation of these disturbing humors be supplied by operation of law with 
a recognized outlet” In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, 
how useful and necessary it is for  republics to provide by their laws a channel by 
which the displeasure of the multitude against a single citizen may find a vent. For 
when none such is regularly provided, recourse will be had to irregular channels, 
and these will assuredly lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne 
down by the operation or the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or 
no disturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being wrought 
by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes of the overthrow of 
free institutions, but by public authority and in accordance with public ordinances, 
which, having definite limits set them, are not likely to pass beyond these so as 
to endanger the commonwealth”. 40. DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF 
TITUS LIVIUS BY NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE 
TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BYNINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A.A PENN STATE 
ELECTRONIC CLASSICS CHAPTER VII  www2.hn.psu.edu/.../machiavelli/Machiavelli-
Discourses-Titus-Livius.pdf
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Attorneys (Prosecutors) are granted standing and can initiate abstract 
form supervision).
Constitutional review based on and initiated by the individual complaints 
has been provided in some of the European countries constitutions. The 
general prerequisite of this form is that the  citizen, filing the complaint 
should have direct stake in the litigation and his rights have to be violated 
by the unconstitutional statute, regulation or action. (In Austria this 
form of revision is provided by 140, 1 and 4, and 144 of the constitution, 
in Germany art 93(1,4a) of the Basic Law, in Spain recurso de amparo 
161(1b) of the constitution, in Switzerland by a public law complaint 
art. 84 of the federal law on the Judiciary.)
The control of constitutionality might scrutinize laws challenged by 
the individual complaint on procedural and substantive basis.31 
Especially valuable analysis has been provided in the recent extensive 
report of the Venice commission treating the direct complaint. “ Study 
on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice”.32 
  Consequences of Constitutional Review vary according to the different 
forms of the constitutional review.
  Prior control of constitutionality is a declaration on the constitutionality 
of a law before it was enacted. The statement of unconstitutionality will 
cause a reconsideration of the parts of the law in conflict to the constitution 
and replace them with provisions in accordance with the constitution. In 
fact this form of constitutional review has a similar effect as a presidential 
veto power. They even might lead to identical outcome if the Legislature 
could amend the constitution with a two thirds majority, and thus avoid 
unconstitutionality preserving the law but changing the constitution 
(this is the effect of overriding a presidential veto) or changing the law 
in compliance with the constitutional review ruling and the constitution 
(the effect is nearly the same as of a successful presidential veto. 
  The outcome of Constitutional court’s decision on unconstitutionality of 
a statute within the system of abstract constitutional review is invalidation 
of a statute in respect to all ( erga omnes ). It is apparent to all the European 
authors that the law declared to be unconstitutional ceases to exist. 
However, there are disputes on the moment when a statute ceases to 
exist. There can be no doubt as to the action of law in the future. Some 
scholars  maintain that the law, declared to be unconstitutional from the 
moment when it was enacted. This assumption raises objections related 
to retroactivity and reasonable arguments with the complex issue how 
to deal with all consequences that followed from the moment when 
the law was enacted till the moment when the constitutional court’s 
decision has been announced.
In the U.S. constitutional law the S.C. is to decide whether unconstitutionality 
invalidates the law ex tunc (retroactive) or ex nunc (pro futuro ) only 
relating to the future. Doctrine of retroactivity was defined by the 
Supreme court in Vanhorne's Lessee v.Dorrance (1795) as a void act 
«never had constitutional existence it is a dead letter, and of no more 
virtue or avail, than if it never had been made „. In Linkletter v. Walker 
(1965)  this doctrine however was reversed with the court stating that 
the constitution neither requires to apply, nor prohibits from applying 
a decision retrospectively.33 
In Austria the constitutional court’s decision has generally an ex nunc 
effect. It annuls a whole or a part of a statute or of a decree that are 
considered to be void from the moment when the court announces 
its decision. On the other hand, the constitutional court has the power 
to annul statutes that have been repealed by the Parliament and this 
proposition implies that the constitutional court’s decision will have a 
retroactive or ex tunc effect. However, the general principle is ex nunc. 
There are two important details a statement of unconstitutionality 
might create an obligation to the Legislature to regulate and resolve 
the effects caused by the same statute since it has been enacted till 
the constitutional court’s decision, or the constitutional court might 
even delay ex nunc effect of its decision. A complicated situation which 
might arise from a repealed statute might be that the other statutes 
that have been repealed might start their action again with no further 
action being necessary from a political institution.34 
In Germany the acts found to be incompatible to the constitution 
are declared to be null. In the cases of abstract or concrete control of 
constitutionality the act is declared void ab initio or the courts decision 
has retroactive ex tunc effect. The only exception from retroactivity is 
the criminal proceedings that are being reviewed in the courts under the 
repealed law. All the other administrative and judicial decisions based 
on the repealed statute will be considered unchallengeable, but their 
enforceability, if not yet made, would be illicit. To avoid a declaration 
of unconstitutionality the constitutional court might use the formula 
of interpretation and to declare only a discrepancy of the statute to the 
constitution.35  
The meeting room of the Venice Commission
With the President of the Venice Commission Gianni Buquicchio
In Italy and Spain decisions of the constitutional courts have the effect 
erga omnes and they do not have retroactive force. (The only exceptions 
where retroactivity takes place are criminal cases when a person was 
condemned under a statute declared to be unconstitutional, or the 
unconstitutional statute has already been repealed) 
  The constitution of Portugal provides for retroactivity of the decisions 
of the constitutional court. Powers of the Portugal's constitutional court 
are very broad and it can fix the effect of unconstitutionality in a more 
restrictive way, when required by legal security, equity or public interest. 
In these circumstances the constitutional court might soften some of 
the consequences resulting from the rigidity of the retroactive action. 
5. SoMe ISSueS SuBJeCT To deBATe In THe ConSTITuTIonAl 
JuRISdICTIon In BulGARIA
The 1991 Constitution established for the first time in the national history 
a specialized institution for the review of the constitutionality of laws.
  The Constitutional Court is a specialized judicial institution, which 
is not incorporated by the judicial branch. The institution has been 
built on the prototype of the German, Austrian, Italian and Spanish 
constitutional jurisdictions with the primary functions to protect and 
enforce supremacy of the constitution as the law of the land, to resolve 
the institutional conflicts over powers according to the constitution, 
to interpret the constitution, etc. By safeguarding the constitutional 
supremacy, the Court serves an important function in protecting human 
rights entrenched in the 1991 Constitution. 
Another set of the Constitutional Court powers comprise verifying the 
constitutionality of international treaties before their ratification, judges 
in presidential, parliamentary elections, rules on the constitutionality 
of the parties and decides on charges brought in an impeachment of 
the President.  
  The Constitutional court excercises posterior, concentrated, abstract 
control for constitutionality of parliamentary legislation and the presidential 
legal acts as the European constitutional review model established in 
1920 Constitution of Austria, created by the famous in Europe and later 
in the US lawyer H. Kelsen, who was among the first justices to serve 
on the court.36  
The Constitutional court comprises 12 justices, appointed for 9 year 
term with no renewal. To safeguard the independence of the institution a 
special appointment procedure has been devised. The National Assembly, 
the President of the Republic and the Supreme court each appoint one 
third of the justices, chosen among lawyers of high professional and 
moral integrity having 15 years of experience at least. 
The access to the court according to the 1991 constitution is very 
restricted, compared to the practice established in the other emerging 
democracies and in the European model of constitutional review. The 
limited standing was considered by the founding fathers to be an important 
step in the safeguarding the effective functioning of this institution, 
since an common argument was brought that it might be overloaded 
with comlaints, especially since the collapse of the communist system, 
and consequently paralyzed.37 
The cases can be reffered to the Constitutional court by one fifth of 
the mps by the President, by the Council of Ministers , by the Attorney 
General, and by the Chief Justices of the Supreme courts of cassation 
and arbitration. The ordinary citizens have not standing to bring a case 
questioning the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation affecting 
their rights.38 
In text that follows I would like to mark some of the controversial issues 
experienced by the constitutional court of Bulgaria in the first decade 
after it had been established.
  One of the first problems the Bulgarian constitutional court had to 
cope with was the scope of the acts that were to be referred for control 
of constitutionality. Initially it was declared that the court will not rule 
on the unconstitutional statutes in force before the adoption of the 
1991 constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. (Par. 3 of the interim and 
concluding provisions of the constitution.) The laws contrary to the 
constitution lose their validity with the new constitution entering in 
force. However in 1996 the constitutional court decided a case on the 
validity of such a statute declaring it to be unconstitutional and due 
to the ex nunc effect of the decision the court admitted that the law, 
though being unconstitutional from the day the 1991 constitution entered 
into force should not be enforced from the moment of the decision’s 
publication i.e. after 1996. 
According to the founding fathers intent constitution clearly states 
that the decisions of the constitutional court have ex nunc binding 
effect. (See art.151, par.2) By the time the constitution was drafted 
part of the constitution makers in the Grand National assembly shared 
the opinion that the retroactivity would undermine the rule of law 
principle which was considered cornerstone in the founding of the new 
democracy after the fall of the totalitarian system. In general liberal 
constitutionalism has condemned retroactivity as instrument which 
undermines social contract, justice, certainty of law and legitimacy of 
31See on  the forms of Judicial Review  Alexander von Brunneck, Constitutional 
Review and Legislation in Western Democracies, in Constitutional Review and 
Legislation, ed. Cr. Landfried, Baden-Baden,1988, 219-263.
32CDL-AD(2010)039rev Study on individual access to constitutional justice - 
Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 85th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 
December 2010) on the basis of comments by Gagik HARUTYUNYAN (Member, 
Armenia),Angelika NUSSBERGER (Substitute Member, Germany) Peter PACZOLAY 
(Member, Hungary).
33This relates especially to criminal law when the decision benefited the prosecuted or 
was essential as a safeguard of innocent persons., see A. R. Brewer - Carias, Judicial 
Review in Comparative Law, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge,1989, 151-155.
34ibid.201-202. 
35Ibid., 214.
36See V. Jackson, M. Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, New York, 1999, 455-
708; M. Cappeletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspecive, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989; A. Brewer - Carrias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law,  Cambridge, 
1988; Constitutional Review and Legislation, ed. Ch.Landfried, Baden-Baden, 1988; 
Constitutional Review, ed. B. van Riermund, 1993; Control in Constitutional Law, 
ed C. M. Zoethout, G. Van  Der Tang , M. Nijohof, 1993; For Bulgarian Constitutional 
Court see in Bulgarian J.Stalev, N.Nenovski, Konstitutzionniat sud, Sofia, 1996 and 
The Constitutional Court of the  Republic of Bulgaria, Jurisprudence, ed. N. Nenovski, 
E. Tanchev, E. Drumeva, Sn. Natcheva and oth., COlPI, Sofia, 1997.
37During the drafting of the 1991 Constitution another arguments for the existence 
of the Constitutional court have been raised . For example it was seen by some 
as a special kind of political justice and by a large portion of the members of the 
Grand National Assembly as a surrogate of the missing  second chamber of the 
constitutional structure of the Republic.
38In one of his last decisions the court has de facto opened a very limited undirect 
access to the citizens on the model of  art. 100 of 1949 Basic law of  Germany.  A 
citizen might bring a case by using the power of the Supreme court to refer the 
question of unconstitutionality to the Constitutional court. 
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the legal order.39 However the constituent assembly did not follow 
fully the idea to prohibit completely retroactive legal acts. Some of 
the argument against full prohibition of ex post facto law was that 
the total exclusion of retroactivity would help some of the ancien 
regime actions to be excluded from punishment and retribution. So 
the prohibition of retroactivity was proclaimed only in the sphere of 
criminal law and it stopped short concerning parliamentary legislation 
in other areas. 
In principle ex nunc effect of the constitutional court’s decisions 
proclaiming unconstitutionality of certain parliamentary statute as a 
whole or some of its provisions is consonant to the certainty of the 
legal system and rule of law since it establishes the presumption that 
until a law is declared contrary to the constitution it is constitutional 
and should be enforced. However there are cases when a law that has 
been declared repugnant to the constitution has seriously affected basic 
human rights and other democratic values of the constitution. In these 
circumstances the presumption of constitutionality and impossibility of 
declaring the law unconstitutional ab initio with ex tunc constitutional 
court’s decision undermines the rule of law. Things can get even worse 
if the parliamentary statute which was declared unconstitutional had 
retroactive effect itself. 
There was discussion in the academia about the temporal effect of 
the interpretative decisions of the constitutional court under art.149, 
par. 1, 1. H.Kelsen, Judicial Review of the Legislation, Journal of Politics, 
N 4, 1942, 183 ; of 1991 Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria. According 
to the classic theory of legal interpretation the act of interpretation 
does not have any legal validity if separated from the act hat it has to 
interpret. It seems that following this constellation the interpretative 
decisions of he constitutional court should have ex tunc effect.40 After 
a robust debate in the academia the constitutional court has accepted 
the position that all of its decisions including those on constitutional 
interpretation have prospective effect. 
  Another problem which has received scholarly attention belongs to 
the nature of the interpretative decisions of the constitutional court. 
The court’s binding interpretative decisions have provided prospective 
non adversarial constitutional interpretation which was successful to 
prevent unconstitutional legislation by resolving the constitutional 
ambiguity ex ante.41  
 Though interpretative decisions share some of the legal features of 
the prior control of constitutionality, advisory opinions and preliminary 
rulings of the European Court of Justice they are unique. Advisory 
opinions are rendered by the International court of Justice or some of 
the states courts in the US on request of government or private parties 
and indicate how the court would rule if adversary litigation should 
arise on the same matter. Contrary to the Bulgarian constitutional court 
interpretative decisions the advisory opinions do not have binding effect. 
Interpretative decisions are rendered like the preliminary rulings when 
different opinions on the content of a provision exist and its content 
is not clear. Both legal phenomena have binding effect – preliminary 
rulings concerning EU law on the national courts and interpretative 
decisions of the Bulgarian constitutional court on national parliament, 
president and government to comply their legal acts or actions with 
the constitutional court holding. 
  Within the context of the constitutional governance the interpretative 
decisions affirm the constitutional court’s position as the constitution 
expositor and mediator between the dormant constituent power (which 
resides in the people or special representative bodies the springs to 
active position triggered by necessity of constitutional amendment) 
and the acting institutions of constituted powers i.e. the legislature the 
executive and the judiciary.
On number of occasions by interpretative decisions the constitutional 
court ex ante defined certain principles and scope of parliamentary 
legislation to meet the requirements of the constitution in the area of 
human rights, freedom of expression and electronic media.
One of the most controversial issues concerns the consequences 
after a provision which was amendment to a parliamentary statute 
has been declared unconstitutional.42 The court by interpretation has 
arrived at conclusion that in this case after its decision has entered in 
force an automatic revival (resurrection, restoration) of the acting before 
the amendment takes place. This interpretation was met with many 
counterarguments the most important of which is that there is no such 
explicit provision of the constitution and that the automatic revival in 
fact is a special case of retroactivity o the constitutional court decision. 
Moreover, the restoration should be considered contrary to the text of 
the art. 22, par. 4 of the Law on the Constitutional Court which states that 
all of the consequences of the law proclaimed to be unconstitutional 
have to be arranged by the institution which has adopted it. Another 
argument against the automatic revival of the acting provisions amended 
with norms proclaimed to be unconstitutional is that the old provisions 
contradict to the logic of the new provisions which were considered 
constitutional. The final result is the paralysis of the whole statute.  
  Some scholars have raised the debate if the stare decisis doctrine is 
valid for the constitutional courts decisions. However, it seems that the 
opposite position has prevailed for abstract constitutional review and 
because the court reversed its decision on the judicial council when 
considering the constitutionality of the law on the judiciary. 
The method of reaching decisions is the last of the controversial issues 
deserving to be marked in this paper. The quorum for conducting meetings 
consists of two thirds of the justices at the constitutional court. The courts 
decisions on unconstitutionality are taken with overall majority which in a 
court of 12 amounts to the 7 justices votes. The constitutional justice has 
been conceived as counter majoritarian check. Decision taking through 
supermajorities makes protection of minority rights when constitutionality 
of law has been challenged more difficult. 
So far by deciding more than a three hundred cases, the Constitutional 
court has been an effective safeguard to the constitutional supremacy 
and has vigorously reacted against the encroachments of parliamentary 
majorities.43 The constitutional jurisdiction has dealt with statutes 
At the meetings with foreign leaders
39One of the most eloquent statements on retroactivity of law belongs to B.Constant. 
In his words “Retroaction is the most evil assault which the law can commit. It 
means tearing up of the social contract, and the destruction of the conditions on 
the basis of which society enjoys the rights to demand the individual’s obedience, 
because it deprives him of the guarantees of which society assured him and which 
were the compensation for the sacrifice which his obedience entailed. Retroaction 
deprives the law of its real character. A retroactive law is not law at all.” B.Constant, 
Moniteur. June 1, 1828, 755 ; Within the natural law theories retroaction was 
considered a just cause for civil disobedience or murdering of tyrants .“Retroactive 
laws, that are ex post facto law legislation depriving man of life and liberty, violate 
the principle of the law’s neutrality. They are thus illegitimate, and resistance to 
them is legitimate” F. Neumann, The Democratic and Authoritarian State, New 
York, 1957, 158.
40The opposite conclusion should mean that before the court pronounced its 
decision the provision of the constitution had one meaning and from the moment 
of the constitutional court’s decision it has acquired another one. If this is the 
case it would lead to no other explanation than that - the Constitutional court 
has overstepped its powers and has amended the Constitution by acting like an 
agent of constituent power.
41See H. Dimitrov, The Bulgarian Constitutional Court and Its Interpretative Jurisdiction, 
37 Colum. J Transnat’l Law 459-505. 
42In Austria and in the Constitution of Portugal there are explicit provisions on the 
revival of the legal norms which have been amended by provisions proclaimed o be 
unconstitutional. In 1940 H. Kelsen has explained this solution of the constitution 
with one of the basic arguments being that it helps to avoid the situation where 
proclamation of unconstitutionality would lead to lacunae or vacuum in the legislation, 
H.Kelsen, Judicial Review of the Legislation, Journal of Politics, N 4, 1942, 183; 
43From 1991 till 2011 the Constitutional court was seized 419 times and has rendered 
300 decisions.
44For analytic review by a keen observer on the constitutional court’s jurisprudence 
see H. Schwartz, The Struggle for the Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist 
Europe, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000, 164-193. 
е. танчев: Конституциялық бақылаудың пайда болуы, эволю-
циясы және қызметі (конституциялық бақылау мәселелері, са-
лыстырмалы және Болгар келешегінде). 
Мақалада конституциялық бақылаудың әр түрлі елдердегі, соның ішінде 
Болгариядағы рөлі мен қызметі талданады. Заңдарды конституциялық 
бақылау қазіргі әлемде әр түрлі формада көрініс тапқан. Конституциялық 
соттар конституциялық және ұлтүсті құндылықтарды, қағидаттар мен 
нормаларды келісу институты ретінде, сондай-ақ ұлттық және ұлтүсті 
құқықтық тәртіптер мен институттар арасындағы дау-дамайларды 
шешу мақсатында әрекет етеді. Бұдан басқа, конституциялық сот-
тар соңғы инстанцияда адамның негізгі құқықтарын сотта қорғаушы 
рөлін атқарады, сонымен қатар, мемлекеттік билік органдарының 
конституциялық өкілеттігін бөлу мәселелерінде төреші ретінде 
әрекет етеді. 
Түйінді сөздер: конституциялық бақылау, сот бақылауы, даулар-
ды шешу, конституциялық сот, конституциялық кеңес, конституцио-
нализм, Ганс Кельзен, Джон Маршалл, Марбери Мэдисонға қарсы, 
адамның негізгі құқықтары. 
е. танчев: генезис, эволюция и функции конституционного кон-
троля (вопросы конституционного контроля в сравнительной 
и Болгарской перспективе). 
В статье анализируется роль и функции конституционного контро-
ля в различных странах, включая Болгарию. Конституционный кон-
троль законодательства в современном мире представлен в раз-
ных формах. Конституционные суды действуют в качестве институ-
та согласования конституционных и наднациональных ценностей, 
принципов и норм, а также в целях разрешения конфликтов между 
национальным и наднациональным правовыми порядками и инсти-
тутами. Кроме того, конституционные суды выполняют роль судеб-
ного защитника основных прав человека в последней инстанции, 
а также выступают в качестве арбитра в вопросах разграничения 
конституционных полномочий органов государственной власти. 
Ключевые слова: конституционный контроль, судебный контроль, 
разрешение споров, конституционный суд, конституционный со-
вет, конституционализм, Ганс Кельзен, Джон Маршалл, Марбери 
против Мэдисона, основные права человека.  
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contradicting more than half of the provisions of the 1991 constitution.44 
Although sometimes the constitutional courts decisions were met with 
severe criticism and hostility from the governing majorities it has successfully 
performed the mission of the guardian of the constitution.
